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THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS
John H. Sargentt
I would like to add my appreciation for the chance to participate in this
As a
stimulating, concentrated, and very well-organized conference.
frequent
who
are
people
that
the
things
newcomer, perhaps struck by some of
attendees take for granted, I am grateful for Professor King's hospitality, the
fine meals, one fine breakfast, good accommodations, and the efficiency and
friendliness of the people working with Professor King. They have been
ready to offer help whenever I looked lost or needed assistance; my
particular thanks to Donovan Steltzner for special assistance on the computer
side on the first day of the Conference.
A number of speakers have discussed aspects of the economics of energy.
I am going to focus on the economics of certain environmental issues that
tend to be linked to energy production and use. More particularly, I will
focus on a sub-group of energy-related environmental issues - air pollutants,
especially criteria contaminants such as SOx and NOx, and greenhouse gases.
I will be mainly concerned with what are often called market-based
instruments as a potential approach to address such pollutants. Much of the
discussion will be at a fairly high level of generality.
Market-based instruments are generally viewed as consisting firstly of
taxes or fees on either emissions or activities that create emissions - this can
be viewed as directly setting a price or charge on emissions, and secondly of
what are known as "tradable emissions allowances or permits." The fact that
the allowances are "tradable" means, as will be discussed, that they too can
be used to put a price or charge on the emissions and/or on the activities that
.cause emissions. Along with sketching the development of these approaches,
I will note some of the issues that are raised by their use, and conclude with
certain observations on the application of these market-based instruments in
an increasingly integrated North American energy system.

t Head, Domestic Emissions Trading Analysis, Climate Change Secretariat, Government
of Canada. B.A., McGill University. Additional biographical information available at page
xvi. This Article is an extended version of the author's remarks at the Conference. The
interpretations offered reflect personal views of the author.
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THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Use of market-based instruments to address environmental problems is
relatively recent and far from pervasive. Probably the oldest approach to
addressing environmental issues has been to rely on voluntary adoption of
good practices, reinforced by ethics. Another approach involves property
rights and litigation. I certainly do not want to discount the usefulness of
these approaches in some situations, but I believe it would be widely agreed
that there are also many situations in which they have not proved sufficient.
The next level of response to environmental problems has traditionally
involved regulation; this is probably the most commonly-used approach in
many of the air-pollution and other energy-related environmental areas. I
will, however, not deal with regulation except to consider a limited number
of areas of evolution from regulation to market-based approaches.
I am going to portray what seem to me to be the key elements in this
evolution through the use of two fables. I use the term "fable" because I am
providing two somewhat oversimplified histories: first, the history of the
development of some academic thinking as to how market-based approaches
might operate; and, second, an oversimplified history of how practical policy
experience has evolved and, to some degree, intertwined with academic
thinking.
First, the academic side. Matt Schaefer used the term "externality,"' and I
do not think that term needs much explanation in this group (which is
reassuring for my purposes). However, just briefly: an "externality" refers to
the notion that some production or consumption activities involve impacts on
third parties, creating benefits and detriments for those who are not involved
in the production or consumption activity. Under these circumstances,
economists have recognized that the price system - that is, the invisible hand
of the markets - cannot be expected to work very well, and cannot achieve
the efficient allocation of resources or the patterns of production and
consumption activity in the economy that might otherwise be expected.
While the term itself was put forward by the British economist A.C. Pigou in
the first quarter of the last century, 2 the general point has been understood, at
least implicitly, for a long time. The formalization of regulation based on
this idea had its genesis in the early part of the 2 0 h Century.
Pigou suggested that, as a potential response and as an alternative to
regulation, one might address the perceived problem with the price system
directly. This problem is that there are costs that are not borne by the people
1 The concept was at least inferred. See generally Matthew Schaefer, Waste Management
in the U.S. Context: Trade or Environmental Issue?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 105 (2002).
2 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
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who are making decisions on how, and how much, to produce or consume; in
response one might try to find means of making those decision-makers bear
such costs. This might be done through regulation that required reduction in
pollution; but it might in principle also be achieved by putting a price on the
externality. For example, to cut back on emissions, one might place a tax on
emissions or a tax on the production or consumption activities that result in
those emissions.
Now, to be able to do this in a way that will achieve the basic objective
with any precision, you must be able to assess the environmental damage that
occurs per unit of emissions or output. This may not be easy; there will often
be an issue as to the acceptable degree of approximation. It is fair to say that,
while Pigouvian theory was rapidly picked up in economics textbooks as part
of the conventional wisdom, there was limited use of Pigou's approach in
North America though perhaps somewhat more use in Europe. Even the
limited use of pollution-related taxes and fees that did occur in Europe and
North America tended to involve rates of such fees that were set not so much
in relation to estimated value of the damages associated with emissions or
other polluting activities, but rather as a way of covering the cost of, say,
whatever level of clean up or waste disposal that the government chose to
implement. Such costs may be more readily ascertainable, and the public
case for imposing such costs on the polluter may be more straightforward
A second potential way to deal with externalities, initially put forth in a
book by the Canadian political economist John Dales of the University of
Toronto3 in the 1960s, is to create a system of "tradable quotas" for units of
pollution, somewhat similar to tradable or transferable catch quotas that have
been used in some fisheries. Under this approach, rather than setting fees at
specified levels per unit of pollution, governments would provide a fixed
supply of allowances to emit or to conduct particular activities with which
emissions were associated. The total supply of allowances would be fixed at
the target level of emissions that the government authority judged
corresponded to an acceptable amount of pollution or emissions. These
allowances might be distributed initially on a gratis basis. One would expect
a market to develop and a price to be established. This would then provide
an alternate way of putting a price on emissions and giving an incentive to
polluters to find the least expensive ways of achieving the target reduction.
Early in the 1970s, W. David Montgomery provided a more rigorous
analysis of the implications of this idea.4 A few years later, Martin
Weitzman pointed out an elementary but important contrast in the two
approaches. Under the fee approach, the government sets the price of the
3 J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES

(1968).

4 W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Pollution Control Programs, 5 J.

ECON. THEORY 395 (1972).
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pollutant; consumer and industry response to that price then determines how
much emissions are reduced and the quantity of emissions that remain.
Alternatively, under the tradable allowance system, government in effect sets
the quantity of the pollutant, and consumer and industry response then
determines the price of allowances, i.e., of emissions. You can have
certainty regarding the price of emissions in the first case, and certainty
regarding the target quantity of emissions to be achieved in the second, but unless you know the exact extent to which industry and consumers will
respond to price - you cannot have certainty regarding both. Some
combinations of uncertainty as to the costs consumers or industry will face in
reducing emissions, and uncertainty as to the benefits from achieving a given
emissions target, may create a case for using an approach that fixes the price
or charge per unit of emissions that polluters have to pay, and some
combinations may create a case for fixing the quantity of emissions to be
achieved. 5
From the start, there was recognition that these pricing approaches - of
whichever type - were only appropriate in some circumstances. It is
certainly easiest to conceive of their use in a situation in which the exact
location or timing of the emissions does not affect the extent of
environmental damage. This will be true of some pollutants - it is probably
the case for sulfur dioxide, and almost certainly the case for greenhouse
gases - but it is not true for many other types of emissions. Moreover, the
approaches are only applicable in situations where a substantial continuing
level of emissions is acceptable given the environment's absorptive capacity.
The approaches would not be candidates for pollutants whose toxicity is such
that the objective of policy is to reduce the levels down to zero. Also, the
approaches are only applicable in those instances where emissions can be
measured with reasonably accuracy and at reasonable cost. Finally, in the
case of the tradable allowances approach, it is helpful to have a substantial
number of emitters subject to the specific regime - i.e., whose allowances
can trade. If there are only a small number of emitters in a particular system,
there may be problems of monopolistic behavior in the allowance market.
REGULATORY REFORM
Turning from the academic to the applied policy fable: in the 1970s, the
regulation of emissions was substantially expanded, especially in the U.S. A
notable step was the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970.6 This was
initially a purely regulatory (or what is sometimes called a "command-andcontrol") approach. At first, the more common approach was to impose
5 See Martin L. Weitzman, Pricesvs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
6 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1970).
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technology standards on major point sources of emissions. Sometimes,
instead of mandating that specific technologies be used, the regulation set a
standard in terms of the total level of emissions from a given source or the
total level of emissions per unit of output from a given source.7 This allowed
more flexibility than a pure technology standard, because the emitter had
some choice in determining how to meet the standard.
Fairly soon thereafter, an additional degree of flexibility was added:
emitters with large facilities containing multiple point sources were subject8
to what is commonly referred to as a "bubble" on their total emissions.
This, again, gave emitters more flexibility as they could substitute reductions
at one of the point sources within their facility for another. Emissions
"banking" was then introduced in certain cases; if emissions were brought
below the constraint at one point in time, that over-achievement could be
used to offset future overages in emissions. The flexibility thus permitted in
the timing of emissions had the potential to further reduce costs of achieving
an overall average target.
These degrees of flexibility within an organization were subsequently
extended, in certain situations, by allowing the trading of surplus emissions
reductions among firms. These approaches permitted significant reductions
in the costs of achieving emissions targets, but the extent to which firms
made use of trading seemed small relative to the opportunities for cost
savings that it potentially offered. As of 1995, the U.S. took another large
step, creating a formal system of tradable allowances under the sulfur dioxide
or acid rain program. 9 The system required that the emitters submit
allowances equal to their emissions on an annual basis. Allowances were
issued in advance, in fixed numbers to each emitter, based roughly on the
emitters' historical emissions levels.1°
Government-issued allowances that were identical - each providing the
right to emit a specified amount of SO 2 anytime after the start of the system,
and that were initially distributed to emitters in advance of the year for which
they would be used, proved to lend themselves to trading to a much greater
extent than had been the case for the individual reductions that were subject
to trade under the previous system. A well-functioning market in allowances
has developed with a well-established price prevailing at any point in time.
The approach is generally viewed as successful and as having lessened the
overall costs of reducing emissions to (or below) the target level.
7 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources).
8 See Recommendations for Alternative Emission Reduction Options Within State
Implementation Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52),
availableat 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 30001 (1979).
9 E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Program for Existing and New
Units).
'o 42 U.S.C. § 7651d.
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With this step, one could thus view the regulatory system as having more
or less converged with the academic notion of the full pricing of emissions,
and potentially with the objective of full correction of the market failure
associated with some types of externalities.
Previous speakers have mentioned that the Kyoto Protocol contains
provisions for emissions trading at the international level that have broad
parallels to, and were at least in part inspired by, the SO 2 emissions trading
system. Domestic tradable allowance systems for certain sources of
greenhouse gases are under active development in a number of the countries
that have indicated an intention to ratify the Protocol, as means of helping
achieve the reductions in such gases to which the countries would commit
should they ratify the Protocol and should it go into force. These domestic
systems could be linked to the Protocol's provisions for international trading
in greenhouse gas emissions rights created by the Protocol.
ISSUES RAISED BY TRADABLE ALLOWANCE SYSTEMS
Having used the fables to attempt to indicate the basic nature of the
tradable emissions allowance approach, let me offer a series of brief
observations on more applied issues that are relevant to the use of this
approach.
Nature of Emissions
As already mentioned, simple versions of the approach are only
appropriate from an environmental point of view if the location and timing of
emissions does not matter in terms of environmental damage. If location or
timing were to matter, trading would have to be restricted; this would both
complicate the system and may reduce the number of participants in any
given trading market below the level required for a well-functioning market.
With some qualifications, environmental issues associated with S02
emissions in the U.S. met these conditions. Greenhouse gases fully meet
these conditions, although emissions of certain other substances that often
occur jointly with greenhouse gases may fail to meet them.
Preceding Regulatory Experience Established a Favourable Context for the
U.S. SO 2 Program.
The evolution of U.S. regulatory experience with S02 turned out to be
very helpful in establishing the conditions for successful introduction of the
S02 tradable allowance program. Firms subject to regulation had acquired
experience in measuring and reporting emissions. The regulatory authorities
had acquired good data on emissions per facility. Further, I think it is
reasonable to speculate that those subject to regulation may well have
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experienced the biggest increase in costs right after the regulation's
enactment.
The subsequent steps leading to the full-scale tradable
allowances system offered more flexibility and ways of reducing the cost of
meeting requirements although some tightening of the overall cap on
emissions accompanied the introduction of tradable allowances. Introduction
of the emissions trading system may well thus have been viewed as a
relatively easy pill to swallow.
Potential new domestic tradable allowance systems for greenhouse gases
would present some important contrasts. Such systems couple a new basic
requirement to reduce these emissions, with an approach that should offer
advantages in terms of costs and flexibility. Understandably, many of those
who are potentially subject to the new system focus on the costs it would
impose on them relative to the cost-free situation in respect to greenhouse
gases that has been their experience to date. They may be less impressed by
the fact that the system may be less costly than some other way of achieving
the same reduction in greenhouse gases.
The Supply of Tradable Allowances
The U.S. SO 2 system involves a fixed supply of tradable allowances, the
vast majority of which are provided at no charge to existing emitters. There
were some concerns that this fixed supply might impose an excessive
constraint on the growth in electricity generation, and/or that it might lead to
instability in permit prices - a point related to our earlier mention of priceversus-quantity uncertainty. These concerns are in part related to the fact
that the demand for electricity is generally viewed as not being very
responsive to price in the short run. Thus, in the event of an unanticipated
shortage of allowances, prices of allowance might have to rise very sharply
before causing an increase in electricity prices sufficient to reduce the
amount of electricity demanded by an amount that would bring electricity
emissions, and thus the demand for allowances, into balance with the fixed
supply of allowances. Thus far, however, no major problems of these types
seem to have developed under the SO 2 program; the substantial reserve of
banked permits that has accumulated may have been an important
contributing factor to dampening potential allowance price instability.
How Far Does the S0 2 Program Go in Fully "Pricing Emissions," or
"Internalizing the Externality"?
This is perhaps more in the nature of a return to the academic discussion
than an applied point, but it may still be of some interest. Without going into
the details, it is the case that when a generator receives a gratis allocation that
is fixed in amount, i.e., the allocation is not related to the generator's current
output, the generator experiences costs at the margin equal to the full price of
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emissions. In standard economic analysis, this is generally regarded as a
good thing, especially if these costs are passed on to these consumers of
electricity so that they must also face the full price of emissions in the cost of
electricity. Reductions in emissions achieved through reducing the amount
of electricity demanded are likely to be part of a cost-effective approach to
reducing emissions, along with abatement actions by generators that reduce
emissions at a given level of output.
Electricity price regulatory systems may, however, inhibit the passing on
of the marginal abatement and allowance costs when a substantial fraction of
required allowances are acquired at no cost. As a result, consumers may not
face the incentive to reduce electricity consumption by an amount consistent
with full internalization of the externality.
Providing Allowances Gratis, versus by Auction
Gratis allocation of allowances (for example, under some form of
"grandfathering" as under the U.S. S0 2 system) is almost certainly of major
help in gaining the acquiescence of the industry subject to the allowance
requirement. It can be viewed as paralleling the general regulatory approach,
under which firms must meet the costs of reducing emissions down to the
required level, but do not face any costs with respect to the remaining,
allowable level of emissions. This contrasts sharply with an auction
approach to allocation (or with an emissions tax), under which firms face a
similar need to reduce emissions and to pay the costs of their reduction to a
point consistent with the overall target level, but where they must also pay
for allowances (or taxes) to cover remaining emissions.
Gratis versus auction allocation of permits is, understandably, a very
sensitive issue. Views on the relative merits and fairness of the two
approaches tend to be affected, among other things, by views as to the nature
of the product market in which the emitter operates. If the market is
basically "domestic," in the sense that a firm's competition comes mainly or
entirely from other domestic suppliers, it is reasonable to expect that a
substantial fraction of the cost of allowances will, sooner or later, be
reflected in higher product prices. This will benefit the producers, especially
the electricity generators in an unregulated market, and suggests that a full
gratis allocation of allowances may not be required to hold such producers
harmless from the emissions allowance requirement. In fact, some recent
analyses of the U.S. electricity sector suggest that provision of gratis permits
equal to as little as 10 percent of historical emissions might be sufficient to
hold shareholders in power generators harmless, although this result also
depends on assumptions as to the operation of electricity price regulatory
systems.
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On the other hand, if the market for the emitter's product is international
in nature, and if most competitors do not face comparable environmental
costs, little or no adjustment in product prices is to be expected. Allocation
by auction could be expected to be subject to extraordinarily strong
opposition by relevant industry sectors in these circumstances.
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS AND CANADA-U.S ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
This final section offers a few comments on the way trading systems may
interact with economic integration in North America, especially in the energy
sector.
You have heard from David Drinkwater that Ontario has just introduced
the first major tradable allowance system in Canada for SOx and NOx." As
he mentioned, one specific feature under this system is that covered Ontario
emitters will be allowed to meet their requirement in part by purchasing
emission reduction credits or allowances from regulated U.S. emitters that
are able to reduce their emissions below regulated levels.' 2 This is the first
form of cross-border trading in emissions rights that we have seen in the
Canada-U.S. context.
Among other things it illustrates the point that a jurisdiction can generally
decide to what extent it will allow its emission reduction objectives to be met
by reductions that occur outside its jurisdiction
The Ontario action might also be viewed as taking a partial step towards
leveling playing fields with respect to the cost of meeting environmental
requirements. Ontario generators will have the option of meeting a portion
of their emissions reduction requirements at costs that presumably will
reflect costs of emissions reduction in the United States. With the increased
integration of our electricity systems, there is pressure to have level playing
fields with respect to environmental requirements, and especially with
respect to the costs of meeting those requirements. Now, if all the
jurisdictions composing an integrated electricity market use tradable
emissions allowance systems to achieve environmental targets, permitting
trade in allowances among the jurisdictions would be expected to equalize
the prices of the allowances. This, together with common coverage of
emissions subject to the allowance requirement, would contribute to leveling
the playing field. The European Union has also been emphasizing the idea of
level playing fields for competitors in various areas. It is very concerned
with electricity integration, and is working to ensure that its emissions
" David Drinkwater, New Electricity: Regulation, Pricing, Wheeling & Regulation, 28
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 267, 281 (2002).
12

id.
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trading system in the electricity sector, as in other covered sectors, will result
in common emissions allowance prices and coverage across national
boundaries.
Another related issue noted in our first session may be worth recalling,
although it relates to environmental regulation in general not just to
regulation through use of market-based instruments. When one country
imposes requirements (and thus costs) on its entities, impacts on
competitiveness can be expected which can be important if the entities are
producing for sale in an integrated product market. What means, if any, may
be legally available, and appropriate for use, by such a country if it wishes to
attempt to achieve some leveling of the playing field through its own actions
by imposing comparable costs on entities from other countries selling into its
market?
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, tradable emissions allowances or permits are a promising
approach in some environmental areas, including the area of achieving
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions for countries that adopt fixed targets
for such gases, whether or not the targets are those in the Kyoto Protocol.
While they offer advantages of overall cost effectiveness, tradable
allowance systems also raise questions of the distribution of benefits and
losses for different players in the system, especially when a new system is
started. As noted, the United States tradable allowance system for sulfur
dioxide evolved from an existing regulatory system. The existing system
was already imposing costs on SO 2 emitters to which they had more or less
adjusted. The further evolution to a tradable allowance system offered
covered firms more flexibility, allowing them more opportunities to reduce
costs to which they were already subject or which they anticipated they
would face if requirements were tightened using the existing approach. It
seems a fair generalization that covered firms did not complain very
strenuously about the introduction of a tradable allowances approach in this
situation.
But opposition to a new tradable allowance system for greenhouse gases,
when no current restrictions on emissions of such gases apply, would likely
be stronger in spite of the potential advantages in terms of costs and
flexibility relative to other means of achieving the same reduction in such
gases.
Finally, with respect to the brief discussion of potential cross-border trade
in emissions allowances in areas where product markets are integrated, the
key point I wanted to advance was that such cross-border trading in
emissions allowances can contribute to leveling playing fields. At the same
time, achieving the potential for such a contribution would no doubt require
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the appropriate meshing of underlying environmental regulatory systems and
appropriate provisions for international trading in allowances.

